Case Notes · Ship operation · Life-saving appliances
The lifeboat interlock
The interlock was installed. It was no longer able to protect.
During a familiarisation drill on a new polar research vessel, a lifeboat with three crew members on board falls from its davit, first onto the deck and then into the sea. The three are slightly injured. A small hydraulic interlock that was meant to hold the winch brake until the davit arms were fully turned out had corroded and had not reset. The manufacturer’s manual called this part crucial. This case note follows the way of that warning from the manual through installation, handover, maintenance and inspection to the drill, and shows where it was lost.
What happened, step by step
The drawing is my own simplified side view, not a reconstruction of the ship: the boat deck with the davit and the lifeboat, on the left an enlarged detail of the winch brake with the interlock, below it the documents in which the information on the interlock should have appeared. Dates and events are taken from the report. The drawing stops before the lifeboat falls. Three scenarios show where the chain could have held.
- Davit (arm turned in on board, turned out over the side)
- Lifeboat on its falls
- Winch drum and brake operating arm (detail)
- Hydraulic interlock cylinder with locking pin (detail)
- Remote control wire to the inside of the lifeboat
- Deck station for launching from the deck (not installed)
- Manufacturer’s operating and maintenance manual
- Planned maintenance system (PMS)
- Service schedule of the statutory inspection
- Checks after recovery and before launching
What happened
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A warning in the manual
The shipyard installs the davits in November 2019. The manufacturer’s manual states that the small interlock cylinder on the brake arm is crucial: it blocks the brake arm against unintended lowering until the davit arms are fully turned out, it needs regular checks and cleaning, and it must be replaced if its rod shows signs of corrosion. The deck station and the training mode remote control described in the manual are not installed.
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Sixteen months without maintenance
The shipyard carries out no routine maintenance on the davits after installation. At handover, the operator’s headquarters suspends all tasks of the planned maintenance system because the engineering department is busy rectifying defects; the master is not told. The monthly routine that includes the interlock cylinder is not done. A defect raised by the crew for the missing training mode remote control is cancelled at handover without action.
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An inspection without the cylinder
On 31 January 2021, a service engineer of the manufacturer’s authorised agent completes the statutory annual inspection of lifeboats and davits. The service schedule does not highlight the interlock cylinder, so it is not inspected, and the engineer is unaware of the consequences if it fails. The safety equipment survey, carried out for the flag state by a classification society, does not identify that the davit installation does not comply with SOLAS.
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Three launches from the deck
On 4 March 2021, at anchor in Loch Buie off the Isle of Mull, the crew begin familiarisation with unmanned launches and recoveries of the port lifeboat. Because the deck station is missing, the method deviates from the manufacturer’s guidance. Nobody refers to the operating plate, the manual, the SOLAS training manual or the risk assessment; there is no briefing, and the drills are running late.
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Recovered, but not checked
After the third launch the crew assume that the launching system works and that it is safe to try the launch from inside the lifeboat. The checks after recovery and before launching are not carried out. Nobody notices that the piston rod of the interlock cylinder is still retracted: according to the report, corrosion had probably made it seize after the earlier launches.
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The launch from inside
At about 11:45 three crew members inside the port lifeboat pull the remote control wire. The hydraulic valve opens, and stored hydraulic pressure moves the davit arms outward. At the same time the wire lifts the brake arm, which the locking pin no longer holds, before the arms are fully turned out. The drawing stops here: the lifeboat drops onto the deck, is dragged over the side by the moving arms and comes off its hooks.
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Why nobody could stop it
Releasing the wire should halt the launch at any point. A securing clip on the wire had been lost and replaced by the shipyard with a larger one; it jammed in the gland of the lifeboat, the wire stayed under tension and held the valve open. The crew inside let go, but nobody on board had a means to stop the arms. The rescue boat towed the lifeboat back; the three crew members were slightly injured.
Scenario A: The warning becomes a task
A thought experiment based on the report: the facts come from the report, the different course of events is my conclusion.
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Named as critical in the plan
The manufacturer’s note on the interlock cylinder appears as a task of its own in the maintenance plan from the day of installation: inspection, corrosion removal, lubrication and function test, as in the manufacturer’s monthly routine. Since the accident, the shipyard requires manufacturers to supply critical maintenance in a separate annex that also covers installation and commissioning.
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The corrosion is found
The monthly routine and the service schedule of the statutory inspection both name the cylinder. The corroded piston rod is noticed long before the drill.
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Replaced as the manual says
The cylinder is replaced, as the manual requires when the rod shows corrosion. After the accident, the investigators found that the cleaned rod returned to its extended position again: the cylinder itself was in good order apart from the corrosion.
Scenario B: The check asks for the locked state
A thought experiment based on the report and on the checks named in it.
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Check after every recovery
After each unmanned launch, the crew check that the locking pin is fully extended over the brake arm. This check is part of the manufacturer’s routine and of the safety checks after recovery described on board; the operating instructions did not include it before launching.
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Pin retracted: nobody boards
The retracted rod is visible. The lifeboat is not manned, the drill stops and the defect is reported. Whether the launches worked no longer matters: the check asks for the state in which the interlock protects.
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Drills without crew on board
According to the report, the operator has since developed checklists for launch and recovery, revised the operating instructions and the risk assessment, and conducts lifeboat drills without crew embarked.
Scenario C: Handover keeps open items open
A thought experiment based on the report: the facts come from the report, the different course of events is my conclusion.
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Commissioning tests every mode
Commissioning focused on the load test, the brake and the lowering speed. It did not include launching from the launching station, the training mode or the launch from inside the lifeboat. A test of every mode described in the manual reveals that the deck station is missing.
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The defect stays open
The crew’s defect for the training mode remote control is not cancelled at handover. As long as it is open, drills with crew inside the lifeboat wait: without the deck station, the launch from inside cannot be simulated from the deck.
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Completed before the first drill
After the accident the ship returned to the shipyard, where the davit installation was completed, and the manufacturer’s agent installed the training mode remote control to meet the SOLAS requirement. In this scenario that happens before the first drill.
- Previous step
- Next step
- Play
- Pause
- Where the chain breaks
- Step
- Where the chain holds
Terms on the boat deck
Lifeboats and davits are life-saving appliances. They are governed by SOLAS and the LSA Code of the International Maritime Organization, not by machinery law. The principle of an interlock is the same: a protective device that only allows a movement in the correct state.
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Davit, falls and winch brake
The davit arms turn the lifeboat out over the ship’s side; the falls are the wires on which it hangs. The winch brake holds the falls. Lifting the brake operating arm releases the brake, and the lifeboat lowers under its own weight.
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Interlock cylinder and locking pin
A small hydraulic cylinder on the brake arm. Its spring pushes the locking pin out over the arm, so that the brake cannot be released too early. When the davit arms are fully turned out, hydraulic pressure retracts the pin. When the pressure is released, the spring has to push it out again: this is the reset.
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Remote control wire, dead ship launch and training mode
In an emergency, the crew launch the lifeboat from inside by pulling a wire, even without the ship’s power: stored hydraulic pressure turns the davits out. Releasing the wire halts the sequence. The training mode simulates this launch from the deck, without crew in the lifeboat.
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Planned maintenance, inspection and survey
The planned maintenance system (PMS) schedules the routine tasks on board. Since 1 January 2020, SOLAS requires annual and five-yearly inspections of lifeboats and davits by the manufacturer or its authorised agent. The safety equipment survey for the flag state checks compliance with SOLAS; the British authority had delegated it to a classification society.
On the profile, the tab on machine safety explains guards and interlocks under machinery law. The case belongs to ship operation; only the principle carries over.
What three launches showed and what was really the case
What three launches showed
The lifeboat had gone down to the water three times and come back up. The crew concluded that the launching system worked and that it was safe to test the launch from inside the lifeboat with crew on board.
What was really the case
The launches had been run from the deck by a method that deviated from the manufacturer’s guidance, so they did not show whether a launch from inside would follow the correct sequence. After them, the piston rod stayed retracted. The locking pin no longer held the brake arm.
My reading: that something worked does not show that it has reset. A protective function has to be checked in the state in which it is meant to protect, here locked again after recovery. A check that asks ‘does it work?’ confirms the last movement; a check that asks ‘is the pin out over the arm?’ confirms the next one.
Installed is not protected: seven weak points
The interlock existed, and the warning about it existed. Seven weak points from the report, each with my reading of how they can be noticed.
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A warning that stays in the manual
The manufacturer called the cylinder crucial and required its replacement if corroded. The service schedule of the statutory inspection did not highlight it, and the service engineer did not know what its failure would mean.
How to notice it: a part the manufacturer calls critical does not appear as a task of its own in the maintenance plan or the inspection schedule.
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Maintenance between installation and handover
For sixteen months after installation, nobody maintained the davits. The piston rod was not designed for a salt-laden atmosphere and corroded where it was exposed.
How to notice it: for equipment installed long before handover, nobody is named who maintains it in the meantime.
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A suspended plan that nobody reports
The operator’s headquarters suspended all PMS tasks, including those for the davits. The senior marine engineer at headquarters responsible for oversight did not consider this critical, and the master was not told.
How to notice it: maintenance of safety-critical systems can be suspended without a decision on board and without a record of what is not being done.
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An installation that differs from the manual
The deck station and the training mode remote control were missing. Commissioning did not test these modes, the crew’s defect was cancelled at handover, and neither the operator nor the survey questioned the gap.
How to notice it: the commissioning record does not cover every operating mode the manual describes.
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Instructions for another version
The operating plate on board was for an earlier version of the system and contained incorrect instructions for normal operation; the chief engineer had pointed this out in a handwritten note. Deck and engineering procedures were compiled separately and not cross-checked, and the operating instructions did not ask for the position of the locking pin before launching.
How to notice it: two documents describe the same procedure differently, or the plate at the equipment does not match the installed version.
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A replacement part that changes a safety function
The original securing clip of the wire had been lost; the larger replacement jammed in the gland. Releasing the wire, the only way to halt the launch, no longer worked.
How to notice it: a replacement part is checked for fit, not for what it does to the function it belongs to.
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Familiarisation without a briefing
The crew had not completed the training recommended by the manufacturer; the familiarisation on board reached mainly the deck department. Because the drills were running late, nobody explained the launch procedure, demonstrated the expected result or checked understanding.
How to notice it: the first launch with crew on board is also the first time the procedure is used as written.
The risk assessment on board named ‘boat falling from height due to equipment failure’ as a hazard. A named hazard protects only when its control measures reach the maintenance plan, the inspection and the check before launching.
The chain: from the manual to the drill
My reading of the report along six links. Each link is a document or a step in which the information on the interlock had to arrive, from the manufacturer to the crew.
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Manufacturer’s information
The manual names the critical part, explains its function and states when it must be replaced.
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Installation and handover
Installation, commissioning and acceptance follow the manual in every operating mode; open defects stay open until they are resolved.
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Planned maintenance
The critical part has its own task from the day of installation, and suspending it is a recorded decision.
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Inspection and survey
The inspection schedule names the critical part, and the survey checks the installation against the requirements.
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Instructions and checks on board
Plate, manual and procedures describe the installed version and ask for the locked state after recovery and before launching.
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Training and drills
The crew know the modes and the sequence, are briefed before the drill and practise without crew on board until the system is proven.
Questions for manufacturers, shipyards and operators
The same questions apply to any installation with an interlock that has to reset after use.
- Which parts does the manufacturer call critical, and where does this reappear: maintenance plan, inspection schedule, checklist?
- Who maintains the equipment between installation and handover?
- Who may suspend maintenance of safety-critical systems, and who has to be told?
- Does commissioning cover every operating mode described in the manual?
- Does the check after use ask for the locked state, not only whether it worked?
- Which version of the equipment do the plate, the manual and the procedures on board describe?
- Does a replacement part keep the function it belongs to, such as the stop?
My work covers documentation and information design. Installation, commissioning, maintenance and inspection remain with the shipyard, the manufacturer, its service agents and the operator; survey and conformity with SOLAS remain with the flag state and the bodies it authorises.
Source
Report 6/2023 of the British Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), ‘Report on the investigation of the falling of a lifeboat into the sea during a launching exercise on board the polar research vessel RRS Sir David Attenborough on Loch Buie, Isle of Mull, Scotland on 4 March 2021’, published in November 2023, with a summary. The investigation does not determine liability or apportion blame. I retell the case in my own words. The drawing is my own, simplified and not to scale. Scenarios, chain and readings are my interpretation, not findings of the report.
According to the report, the operator has since introduced checklists for launch and recovery and revised its operating instructions and risk assessment; the shipyard has changed its procurement terms for new ships; the manufacturer’s agent installed the training mode remote control. The MAIB recommended that the Maritime and Coastguard Agency review how it delegates safety equipment surveys to recognised organisations and whether initial surveys of new ships should be delegated at all.
Related on the profile: documentation management
Related on the profile: evidence and traceability